In this paper we present a generalization of the concept of balanced game for finite games.
Introduction
One of the main problems of cooperative game theory is to define a solution of a game ν, that is, supposing that all players join the grand coalition N, an imputation to each player represents a sharing of the total worth of the game ν(N ). In the case of finite games of n players, an imputation 1 can be written as a n-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that n i=1 x i = ν(N ). Of course, some rationality criterion should prevail when defining the sharing.
In this respect, the core is perhaps the most popular solution of a game. It is defined as the set of imputations x on N such that In this case, (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a possible satisfactory sharing function because no player can do better, even when forming coalitions with other players.
It is a well known fact that the core is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced [1] .
However, there are games whose core is empty. It is then necessary to give an alternative solution. In this sense, many possibilities have been proposed in the literature, as the dominance core stable sets, Shapley index, Banzhaf index, the -core, the kernel, the nucleolus, etc. (see e.g. [6] ).
On the other hand, Grabisch has defined in [9] the concept of k-additive capacities (capacities are monotone games). These capacities can be defined with a reduced number of coefficients and they bring up a model that is both flexible and simple to use. For k-additive capacities, the value of k (varying between 1 and n) denotes the maximum cardinality for which the Möbius transform [14] does not vanish, i.e., k represents the maximum cardinality for which subsets can reach importance by their own. The concept of k-additivity extends the concept of additivity in the sense that probability measures are indeed 1-additive capacities. Therefore, k-additive capacities generalize the concept of probability and they fill the gap between probabilities and general capacities. Moreover, as they are defined in terms of the Möbius transform and this transform can be applied to the characteristic function of any game (not necessarily monotone), the concept of k-additivity can be extended to games as well.
The aim of this paper is to provide another solution concept, called the k-additive core, which we think to be a natural generalization of the core. The basic idea is to remark that an imputation is nothing else than an additive game, and if the core is empty, we may allow to search for games more general than additive ones, namely k-additive games, dominating the game. This leads to the concept of k-imputation, that is, an imputation over all coalitions of at most k players. We present a generalization of the concept of balanced games, that we will call k-balanced games; as it will be explained below, these games are those admitting a dominating k-additive game and no dominating (k − 1)-additive game. We will see that any game is k-balanced for a suitable choice of k, so that this concept can be applied to any game. By definition of the k-additive core, the total worth assigned to a coalition will be always greater or equal than the worth the coalition can achieve by itself, thus keeping the essential spirit of the notion of core; however, the precise sharing among players has still to be decided (e.g., by some sharing or bargaining process) among each group of at most k players.
Moreover, from a k-additive imputation, we propose a procedure to obtain a representative value (that in general is not an imputation) for each dominating k-additive game based on a pessimistic criterion; for each player, this value represents its minimum payoff. From this, we show that the value of k could be seen as a degree of stability of the game. Hence, players should prefer k as small as possible, which shows that if the core is nonempty, imputations from the core should be taken in priority.
Then, we deal with the problem of deriving a classical imputation from a k-additive imputation. In this sense, we propose a new sharing procedure. Anyway, any procedure to derive an imputation could be applied.
Finally, we look for necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to be k-balanced for a fixed value of k. In particular we show that any game admits a 2-additive game dominating it, so that any game is either balanced or 2-balanced. If we impose monotonicity, that is, if we deal with capacities instead of games, then the situation is more complex.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give the basic concepts on games and capacities that we will need throughout the paper. We also introduce the concept of balanced game and give its interpretation. In Section 3 we introduce the concept of k-balanced games; Section 4 is devoted to deriving possible solutions from the k-additive core. In Sections 5 and 6
we look for necessary and sufficient conditions for a given game (resp. capacity) to be k-balanced (resp. k-balanced monotone). We finish with the conclusions and open problems.
Basic concepts
Let us consider a set of n players N = {1, . . . , n}. Coalitions of players are subsets of N, denoted by capital letters A, B, and so on, and also {i 1 , . . . , i j }. Whenever possible, we will omit braces in order to avoid a heavy notation, so {i 1 , . . . , i j } turns into i 1 , . . . , i j , especially for singletons and pairs. The set of all subsets of N is denoted by P(N ), while the set of all subsets of N of cardinality smaller or equal than k is denoted by P k (N ). We start with an example that will play the role of running example for the paper. How should the space be shared?
If, in addition,
whenever A ⊆ B, the game ν is said to be monotone;
From the point of view of Game Theory, for any A ⊆ N, the value ν(A) represents the minimum asset the coalition of players A will win if the game is played, whatever the remaining players may do, i.e., ν(A) is the payoff that coalition A can guarantee for itself.
Definition 2.
A non-additive measure [5] or capacity [3] or fuzzy measure [18] ν over N is a monotone game with ν(N ) = 1.
Consider a monotone game different from the trivial game defined by ν(A) = 0, ∀A ⊆ N . In this case, we can divide all the values of ν by ν(N ) so that we obtain a new game ν equivalent to ν. Then, ν is a capacity and we conclude that any monotone game can be equivalently represented by a capacity. From now on, we will denote by G(N ) the set of all games over N and by FM(N ) the set of all capacities.
Example 1. (Continued) The situation stated previously can be modelled through the capacity
There are other set functions that can be used to equivalently represent a game. We will need in this paper the so-called Möbius transform. Dempster [4] and Shafer [15] .
Let us now recall the basic results on balanced games. The value x i is the asset player i receives when sharing ν(N ). Several solutions for obtaining imputations have been proposed, the Shapley value [16] being among the most popular. However, it could be the case that some of the players do not consider their corresponding value as a satisfactory asset. Suppose that the imputation satisfies x(A) ≥ ν(A), for all A ⊆ N . Then, no subcoalition of players has interest to form, since they will receive more by the sharing (x 1 , . . . , x n ). In other words, any such (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a possible satisfactory imputation for all players. When the core is nonempty, it is usually taken as the solution of the game. However, there are games with an empty core. Then, the following definition arises:
Definition 5. Let ν ∈ G(N ). We say that a vector
For the special case of ν being a capacity, if (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is in the core, it follows that (x 1 , . . . , x n ) determines a probability distribution on N dominating ν. Thus, in this case, C(ν) coincides with the set of all probabilities dominating ν, and the concept of balanced games translates to capacities as follows: Definition 8. A capacity ν is said to be balanced if it admits a dominating probability measure.
Note that for the case of the core, giving a dominating additive game, the value x i coincides with m(i).
Let us turn to the concept of k-additivity. In order to define a capacity, 2 n − 2 values are necessary. The number of coefficients grows exponentially with n, and so does the complexity of the problem. This drawback reduces considerably the practical use of capacities. Then, some subfamilies of capacities have been defined in an attempt to reduce complexity. In this paper we will use k-additive capacities. This choice is based on two facts: First, as we will see below, kadditive capacities are a generalization of probability distributions and thus, they are suitable to define a concept extending the core. Secondly, they are defined in terms of the Möbius transform and therefore, it seems natural to use this transformation in the sharing procedure. Moreover, the value of k can be interpreted as the maximum size for which a coalition has a non-null dividend and consequently, the maximum cardinality for which a sharing is needed; this will be interesting when interpreting k-balanced games. Additive games are 1-additive games, and so probability measures are 1-additive capacities (indeed, 1-additive belief functions); thus, k-additive capacities generalize probability measures.
More about k-additive capacities can be found, e.g., in [10] .
The value k represents the maximum cardinality for which subsets can reach importance by their own. We will denote by G k (N ) (resp. FM k (N )) the set of games (resp. capacities) being
Let ν be a game. If the core of ν is empty, it is not possible to find a satisfactory imputation for all players (in terms of coalitional stability; there are other solution concepts for a game that are appealing imputations, as the nucleolus or the Shapley value to cite a few). Since from Remark 2 the core is the set of 1-additive dominating games, when it is empty it is natural to look for 2-additive games dominating ν; if this set is empty too, then look for 3-additive games dominating ν and so on. This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 10. A game ν on N is called k-balanced if there exists a k-additive game dominating it and no game in
In this sense, a balanced game is indeed a 1-balanced game. We will denote by BAL k (N ) the set of all k-balanced games on N . As any game ν is k-additive for a suitable choice of k, then ν is k -balanced, for some value k ≤ k. This implies that the collection {BAL
We will see in Section 5 that in fact this structure simplifies drastically.
Definition 11. (i) Given a game ν, we define the
as the set of all k-additive games dominating ν, i.e.,
(ii) A k-imputation for ν is a sharing of the worth ν(N ) among all coalitions of at most
We stress the fact that any k-order imputation x in the k-additive core of a game ν is such that the total amount given to coalition A, which is ν * (A) := B⊆A|B∈P k (X) x(B), is at least equal to ν(A). This is our generalization of coalitional stability.
As stated before, from a mathematical point of view the set of capacities constitutes a special class of games. In many applications (for example in Imprecise Probabilities [19] ), it is interesting to study the set of probabilities dominating a given capacity; in these frameworks, it makes no sense to remove the condition of monotonicity. Then, it seems interesting to extend the concept of dominance to the k-additive case, but keeping monotonicity. This leads us to the following concept: As for the general case, {BAL
For the special case of belief functions, the following can be shown: . Consider an order i 1 i 2 · · · i n on N and let us define P by:
It is straightforward to see that P is a probability measure dominating ν * , whence the result.
As a consequence of this result, the following can be proved for k-balanced capacities (k > 1):
This means that if a capacity has an empty core, we necessarily need to allow negative dividends in order to dominate it. (ii) The imputation x ∈ R n derived from m * is defined for player i by
Clearly, x is a well-defined imputation. In a sense, the values m * The following lemma gives a justification of the proportional sharing. 
Lemma 1. Let ν ∈ G(N ). Then there exists ν
Therefore, the result holds.
Remark that for (N ) that is given to player i. Then, the allocation for i is
As ν is essentially the same game, the proportion of m (N ) that is given to i should be again α i . Then, the final value for i is
On the other hand, note that
whence, assuming i∈N m * (i) = 0,
. 
Example 1. (Continued) In the running example, we have already proved that ν ∈ BAL

Why the k-additive core with smallest k should be preferred
A central question is the following: Why a dominating additive game should be preferred to a dominating 2-additive game? In other words, we need to justify the fact that, for a game ν, we look for a dominating k-additive (monotone) game ν * with k as small as possible. This is important in the sense that we want our solution to be a generalization of the core and not an alternative to it; thus, it is necessary to show that whenever the core is not empty, it still constitutes the solution of the game.
Remark that, depending on the sharing procedure that is applied, the payoffs of the players can vary. If player i is pessimist, he might think that he will receive all the quantities coming 
•
• If i ∈ B and m * (B) < 0, then
Therefore,
Following this process for all B and all A ⊆ B, the result holds.
In particular, Proposition 3 shows that if a k-additive game ν * dominates ν and it is also possible to obtain by contraction of ν * a k -additive dominating game ν with k < k, then all the players should be indifferent or prefer ν instead of ν * in terms of their minimal values.
This shows that k might be seen as a measure of stability, in the sense that the smaller k is, the happier the players are and the corresponding game is more "stable". From an interpretational point of view, the players should prefer k as small as possible, as large coalitions would lead to more conflicts to share (or afford) the value m * (A).
If we had considered the optimistic criterion, then the representative value for player i would be given by
In this case, players would look for coalitions as large as possible because they are confident about the sharing procedure. This would imply that for balanced games, the core might not provide optimal sharing functions. Indeed, from the point of view of expectations, these games would be quite unstable, as players could feel upset when their expected values could not be attained for all of them.
Suppose that we are dealing with the monotone case and assume that ν * is a k-additive belief function. It can be easily seen that any (k −1)-additive belief function ν obtained by contracting ν * is also a belief function and ν ≥ ν * , so the choice of ν instead of ν * seems rather sensible.
For the optimistic criterion, a belief function would be preferred to a probability, that does not seem natural, as the probability dominates the belief function and is simpler. This is another argument in favor of the pessimistic behavior and against the optimistic.
Note that the result of Proposition 3 only applies when ν is a contraction of ν * . If this is not the case, we can obtain that some players would prefer ν * . Indeed, it is possible that some 
Notice that (P1) has always a finite optimal solution, since z is bounded below by ν(N ). Take 
Theorem 1. Consider ν ∈ G(N ). Then ν has a nonempty k-additive core if and only if the optimal value of the objective function of (P1) is
Let us consider the dual program of (P1), which we shall call (D1):
By the strong duality theorem, we deduce that a necessary and sufficient condition such that the k-additive core is nonempty is that the optimal solution y * of (D1) is such that q * = ν(N ).
Hence, we are lead to the following definition and result.
Definition 16. We say that C ⊆ P(N ) is a k-balanced family if there exist positive constants
We call y = {y S } S∈C a k-balanced vector for C, whose components are called k-balanced
coefficients.
Theorem 1 can be then rewritten as follows.
Proposition 4. Consider ν ∈ G(N ). Then ν has a nonempty k-additive core if and only if every
k-balanced family C with k-balanced vector y satisfies:
The following result shows that there is only one k-balanced family, as soon as k > 1. 
Substituting ( 
. Therefore, for any coalition S of s elements:
Thus ν * (S) is a linear increasing function in k 1 , whence ν * (S) can be made as large as necessary to obtain dominance.
k-balanced monotone families
We turn now to the problem of finding sufficient and necessary conditions for the nonemptiness of the k-additive monotone core of some capacity. Since the approach is similar to the previous section and to [13] , we omit proofs.
Consider a capacity ν on N. In this case, if ν ∈ FM k (N ) and m denotes its corresponding Möbius transform, the linear programming problem (P1) changes into (P2):
The first line of constraints is necessary in order to ensure dominance. The second line of constraints in (P2) is needed to ensure monotonicity (Proposition 1).
As for (P1), the following can be shown. We consider the dual problem of (P2), that we shall name (D2). It is given by:
The variables y A come from dominance constraints. Variables y i,A come from the monotonicity constraints of Equation (6).
Let us denote by q * the optimal value of the objective function of (D2). As before,
Therefore, in order to find conditions for the k-additive core to be nonempty, it suffices to find the conditions for q * = 1.
We are now in position to introduce the concept of k-balanced monotone family:
and C 1 ⊆ P(N ), C 2 ⊆ Q two collections, at least one of them being nonempty. We say that
We say then that vector y = (y S , y (i,T ) ) S∈C 1 ,(i,T )∈C 2 is a k-balanced (monotone) vector for C whose components are called k-balanced coefficients.
Note that k-balanced vectors are the feasible solutions of the dual problem (D2). The elements in C 1 correspond to variables in the dominance constraints, while elements in C 2 are related to monotonicity conditions. Example 3. Suppose |N | = 3, and k = 2. We give two examples of 2-balanced monotone families:
This is the unique 2-balanced family.
This shows that contrarily to the case of games, there is not a single k-balanced monotone family.
On the set of all k-balanced monotone families, it is possible to define the following operation:
define the union of these families as
With these operations, the following can be shown:
The set of k-balanced monotone families is a sup-semilattice [7] , with partial order ⊆ and C ∨ D = C ∪ D.
As a consequence, we have that the union of a finite number of k-balanced monotone families is a k-balanced monotone family. As N is a finite set, the number of k-balanced monotone families is finite. Thus, this implies that the set of all k-balanced monotone families is a complete supsemilattice [7] . Note that from the definition of minimal k-balanced monotone family, these families are atoms in the sup-semilattice of k-balanced monotone families [7] . Then, as the set of all k-balanced monotone families with the operation ⊆ is a finite sup-semilattice, we have: We state now the main result of the section, that gives a necessary and sufficient condition to obtain a k-additive capacity dominating another capacity. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a generalization of the concept of balanced games, called kbalanced games. These games are those admitting a dominant k-additive game. We have shown that k represents the minimum degree of interaction that we have to permit for the existence of a dominating game. We have derived a representative value for each player based on the pessimistic criterion. From these representative values, we have justified that the value of k can be interpreted as a degree of stability of the game. We think this generalization could shed light on games which are not balanced and might give insight in the theory of Cooperative Games.
We have also looked for necessary and sufficient conditions for a game (resp. a capacity) to be at most k-balanced (resp. k-balanced monotone). For the case of games, we have shown that the 2-additive core is never empty, which means that any game is either balanced or 2-balanced.
The situation for the k-additive monotone core is more complex, but any capacity is k-balanced monotone for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Another problem is determining the k-additive core of a given game. This could be interesting in order to give representative values for the players. In the monotone case, this set is a convex polytope, so that it is defined through the vertices. A step in this direction for k-additive games can be seen in [11] .
We have taken as a basis for our generalization of the core the point of view of coalitional stability. A more fundamental point of view could be to consider non-dominated imputations (see, e.g., Owen [13] ). In the classical case, the two approaches coincide if the game is superadditive.
This could be a very interesting topic to investigate in the future.
